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A Tale of Two Systems? Success and 
Failure in a Single Information System 
Implementation 
Catherine Middleton, York University, Toronto, Canada 
Introduction 
This paper presents a case study of an information system (IS)implementation in a new 
university. A successful implementationwas anticipated but was not achieved. The 
designers were satisfiedwith the system but secondary users were dissatisfied and 
frustratedby restricted system access. An examination of the university'sculture and 
management structure reveals strong political reasonsfor the primary users to exert power 
over the secondary users.Markus's (1983) interpretation of interaction theory is used 
todiscuss the political implications of the system design. It isconcluded that senior 
management must be aware of the broad implicationsof information systems adoption in 
their organizations, and understandthe potential for designers to use systems as sources of 
power.  
The case is significant as it is evaluated from the perspectiveof both user groups, using a 
framework derived from the literatureon systems implementation and information 
systems failure. Thestudy shows how a single system can be a success and a 
failuresimultaneously.  
University Background 
Private University was a new university, with the goal of becomingan institute of higher 
education significantly different fromthose existing in the public sector at the time. It was 
the administrativestaff's responsibility to establish the organizational structureand 
systems that would allow the university to meet this objective.  
System Implementation and Development 
The implementation of an automated student information systemwas recognized as an 
essential administrative task. The universitywas in an ideal position to implement a 
system successfully. Therewas no existing system to replace and as the university had 
noestablished routines and administrative procedures, it was expectedto be easy to install 
a system to meet the university's needs.After an intensive search, a system used in many 
American universitieswas purchased. The system met the university's basic needs 
butwould require much customization.  
The system development process was under the jurisdiction of theregistrar, who was 
responsible for daily operations, future modificationsand maintenance. The development 
team consisted of three individuals,two with extensive university experience and one who 
was a skilledprogrammer. This team worked closely with the registrar to 
determineadministrative procedures, andspent much time designing the individual 
components of the system.  
The system was developed by the project team alone, with no inputfrom other users, who 
were fully occupied with their own responsibilities.The functions that were being 
developed initially were ones thatwould remain within the jurisdiction of the registrar's 
office,thus the exclusion of other users from the design process wasperhaps 
understandable.  
However, subsequent design stages involved information and processesessential to the 
secondary users who would need to use the systemextensively. But the design process 
was entrenched, allowing noopportunity for these users to have input into the system, 
ormore importantly, into the design of the processes that were beinginstitutionalized by 
the implementation of the system. The entiresystem was designed with minimal input 
from secondary users, whowere presented with a finished product and an indication thatit 
was not open to modification. Aware that a student record systemof some sort was 
essential, users were forced to accept the systemas provided, even though it was barely 
adequate and had many shortcomings.  
How did primary and secondary users evaluate this system? Theregistrar's office (primary 
users) maintained control of the system,and was responsible for all data input, regardless 
of the natureof the data. Read-only access was granted to secondary users whorequired 
information on current and prospective students. Theseusers were not, however, able to 
generate reports, search thedatabase, or download information. The registrar's staff had 
fullaccess to the database, and were to provide the other users withadditional information 
on request. But was this situation satisfactory?Could the system be considered a success?  
Two Perspectives on Private University's Information System 
Literature on systems failure and successful systems implementationwas reviewed to 
determine evaluation criteria for system implementationprojects (see full paper for the 
details of this review). Twelvecriteria were identified for use in evaluating the 
university'ssystem, using the work of Ackoff (1967), Bostrom and Heinen (1977),Schmitt 
and Kozar (1978), Senn (1978), Ginzberg (1981), Daviset al. (1992), DeLone and 














Was the project 
terminated? No No Success Success 
Was it agreed that the 
project was a failure? No Uncertain Success Uncertain 
Did the users resist the 
system? No Yes Success Failure 
Were the users satisfied 
with the system's scope? Yes Uncertain Success Uncertain 
Was the system 
designed to meet users' 
needs? 
Yes No Success failure 
Was the quality of the 
information system 
acceptable? 
Yes Not entirely Success Failure 
Was the information 
produced by the system 
of acceptable quality? 
Yes Sometimes Success Failure 
Was the information 
used? Yes Not always Success Failure 
Did the information 
impact upon 
management decisions? 
Yes Sometimes Success Failure 




Lack of info. 
had a negative 
impact 
Success Failure 
Did senior management 
support the system? Yes No Success Failure 
Was the system able to 
evolve with a changing 
organizational 
environment? 
Yes Uncertain Success Failure 
The table shows two vastly different assessments of the system.As expected, the system 
designers and primary users consideredthe system to be a success on most criteria. In 
stark contrast,the staff in the faculties and the marketing office viewed thesystem as 
inadequate and unresponsive to their needs. From theirperspective, the system was a 
failure.  
Analysis 
Was the misfit between the secondary users' system requirementsand the system as 
implemented intentional or was it because ofthe technical limitations of the system?  
Because users were led to believe that the system was technicallycomplex, they did not 
demand access to it immediately. The developersallowed users no access to system 
documentation, thereby perpetuatingthe myth of technical complexity and discouraging 
users from learningthe true capabilities of the system. The control that the 
developersexerted over system access is indicative of a faulty design process.By their 
refusal to accord users the necessary access privilegesfor effective system use, the 
systems designers exhibited a TheoryX view of the system users (Bostrom and Heinen, 
1977). But didthe designers restrict system access because they felt secondaryusers were 
incompetent, or was there another motive? At this earlystage of the university's 
development the designers were extremelybusy developing and implementing 
administrative procedures andacademic policies. However, by allowing the secondary 
users accessto the database, a portion of their excessive workload could havebeen 
reduced. The secondary users were not looking to input orchange data, they merely 
required access to useful data for administrativepurposes. To them it was 
incomprehensible that direct access tothe system was denied, as it would reduce the 
workload of theadministrative staff.  
To understand this apparent paradox, it is instructive to considerthe structure of Private 
University, and to understand the implicationsof funding this university on tuition fees 
alone.  
The diagram on the next page shows the organizational structureof Private University, 
with the faculty and administrative links.It also shows, indirectly, the division between 
revenue generatorsand expense generators. Tuition revenues were earned by the 
faculties.Although the support services of the offices were essential ingenerating 
enrollments, the administrative offices were consideredcost centers. When funds were 
abundant, faculties worked in closecooperation with the administration, sharing the 
common goal ofexcellence in education. But the bankruptcy of the university'sfounder 
just prior to the university's opening created a splitin the ranks. The faculties became 
critical of the expenses generatedby the administration, and demanded significant cuts in 
staffinglevels. Administrative managers effectively lost control of theirbudgets, as they 
were forced to comply with the wishes of thefaculties. The centralized nature of the 
university's structurecame under fire, with the faculties suggesting that they couldbetter 
provide the centralized administrative services themselves.  
 
The administrators were defenseless and had little choice butto comply with the requests 
of the faculties. The student informationsystem, however, was one area where the 
administration could retaincontrol and resist faculty demands. The deans were generally 
unawareof the system's capabilities, and despite pleas from their staffto gain more control 
over the system, deans showed little interestin its management, thus allowing the 
registrar's staff to usethe information system as a potent political tool.  
By controlling access to the system, the registrar's staff becameindispensable. Granted, 
there was a need for central maintenanceof student information, but control was not what 
secondary userssought. They simply required access to the information. By denyingthis 
access, the registrar's staff created a power base aroundthe system. The faculties could 
not decentralize the student informationsystem, and thus were subjected to the power 
plays of the registrar'sstaff.  
A Political Perspective on the System Development 
Markus's (1983) use of interaction theory to examine the politicalaspects of systems 
design is instructive here. She suggests thatinformation systems failure is "because of an 
interactionbetween the characteristics related to the people and characteristicsrelated to 
the system". There were no inherent power implicationsin the system used in this case. It 
was in determining accessprivileges to the system that power issues arose. As 
gatekeepers,the primary users could exert power over the secondary users,power that 
could not otherwise be derived from their positionin a non-revenue generating office.  
The registrar's office denied access to the system for technicalreasons. Yet they used a 
simple, accessible report writer to generatethe data requested by secondary users. If the 
secondary usershad been granted access to this system, the primary users in theregistrar's 
office would have ceded their sole source of power.  
Markus and Bj¿rn-Andersen (1987) discuss the exercise ofpower by IS professionals over 
users. This is precisely what occurredin this case. Markus and Bj¿rn-Andersen could be 
describingthe design team in noting: "IS professionals exercise powerover user behavior 
by creating organizational structures and routineoperating procedures that give them 
formal authority over usersor foster user dependence on them for important resources."  
Conclusion 
What can be learned from this case study? It is clear that systemsdesigners can exert 
significant power over users through the structureof system-organization interaction. The 
power exerted at PrivateUniversity was not a function of the technology employed, butof 
organizational politics.  
The systems designers were able to use the system as a politicaltool because the senior 
managers were unaware of its importanceto those who most needed it, and of its potency 
for providingessential information. This case highlights the necessity forsenior 
management to understand the technology implemented intheir organizations. As Ackoff 
(1967) notes, "No MIS shouldever be installed unless the managers for whom it is 
intendedare trained to evaluate and hence control it, rather than be controlledby it".  
This case also shows that information systems should fit the environmentin which they 
operate. The gatekeeping role played by the designerswas not appropriate in an 
atmosphere where all offices had tobe responsive to faculty needs. The university needed 
a systemthat encouraged the users to work toward common goals, ratherthan one that 
allowed one group of users to play political gamesand exert power over another.  
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